

EVALUATION
ONLINE LEARNING
LINKS WITH OPTIMIZATION AND GAMES
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS–SACLAY



SOLVING TWO-PLAYER ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH BLACKWELL'S
APPROACHABILITY

The approach from the course for solving two-player zero-sum games was to use two regret minimizing algorithms against each other. Those regret minimizers could be derived from Blackwell's approachability. In this project, we explore a possibly different approach for solving two-player zero-sum games directly with Blackwell's approachability, without defining regret minimizing algorithms as an intermediate step.

Let $m, n \geq 1$ be two integers and A a real-valued matrix of size $m \times n$. We consider the following approachability problem.

Let $\mathcal{A} = \Delta_m \times \Delta_n$ the set of actions of the Decision Maker and $\mathcal{B} = \{\emptyset\}$ the set of actions of Nature¹². Consider the following outcome function $g : \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^n$ defined as

$$g((a, b), \emptyset) = (Ab - \langle a, Ab \rangle \mathbb{1}, -A^\top a + \langle a, Ab \rangle \mathbb{1}), \quad (a, b) \in \mathcal{A},$$

and target set $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{R}_-^m \times \mathbb{R}_-^n$.

¹not the empty set, but the singleton containing the empty set.

²Note that in this problem, the elements of \mathcal{A} will be denoted (a, b) , hence b will not be an element of \mathcal{B} but part of an element of \mathcal{A} .

- 1) Prove that \mathcal{C} satisfies Blackwell's condition for outcome function g and give an associated oracle α .
- 2) Give explicit expressions for Blackwell's algorithm and the Greedy Blackwell algorithm in this approachability problem. Are those algorithms different from RM and RM+ in the context of solving two-player zero-sum games? If so, write the corresponding guarantees, and derive as corollaries upper bounds on the duality gap.
- 3) Let $p, q > 1$ such that $1/p + 1/q = 1$. Consider regularizer

$$b_p(x) = \frac{1}{2} \|x\|_p^2 + \mathbf{I}_{\mathcal{C}^\circ}(x), \quad x \in \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^n.$$

- a) Prove that for all $y \in \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^n$,

$$\nabla b_p^*(y) = \left(\|y_+\|_q^{2-q} (y_+)_i^{q-1} \right)_{1 \leq i \leq m+n},$$

where $y_+ = (\max(0, y_i))_{1 \leq i \leq m+n}$.

- b) Give an explicit expression of the action (a_t, b_t) given at time $t \geq 1$ by the associated DA algorithm (with constant parameters 1), in terms of A , $(a_s)_{1 \leq s \leq t}$ and $(b_s)_{1 \leq s \leq t}$.
- c) Derive guarantees on the duality gap.
- 4) Define and analyse similar algorithms from the MD family (with constant step-size 1).
- 5) Perform numerical experiments. Compare the performance of the above algorithms to RM and RM+.
- 6) BONUS. — Extend this approach to the context of extensive-form games and perform numerical experiments.

